7/15/2024 CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 1 PAMELA Y. PRICE /s/ Remedios Galvez District Attorney, Alameda County 2 AIMEE SOLWAY 3 Deputy District Attorney State Bar No. 281477 4 7677 Oakport St. Ste 650, Oakland, CA 94621 5 Phone: 510-777-2286 6 E-Mail: aimee.solway@acgov.org Attorneys for the People 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 **COUNTY OF ALAMEDA** 9 10 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF No. 118376 CALIFORNIA, 11 PLAINTIFF, PEOPLE'S **MOTION** REQUESTING OF **SENTENCE** RECALL 12 RESENTENCING **HEARING** VS. **PURSUANT TO 1172.1** 13 ERNEST EDWARD DYKES, Dept. 13 14 **DEFENDANT.** August 13, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. 15 16 The People move the Court to recall the sentence of Ernest Edward Dykes and 17 resentence him in the interests of justice. This motion is made upon the grounds that the circumstances of the case warrant that the court exercise its discretion and re-examine the 18 disposition in the case. 19 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 21 On July 26, 1993, Ernest Dykes shot Bernice Clark and killed nine-year-old Lance 22 Clark during the course of a robbery. 23 Seventy-year-old Bernice Clark owned an apartment building in East Oakland. 24 Ernest Dykes (and his mother) lived for several months in one of Clark's apartment units.

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visits to the apartment building. Bernice would often cash checks for her tenants and lend

Bernice was known by her tenants, including Dykes, to carry cash on her frequent

This apartment looked down on the rear parking lot of the building.

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them money. Bernice was also known to bring her grandson Lance with her to the apartment when she visited.

On July 26, 1993, Bernice drove to the rear parking lot with Lance in the front passenger seat. A tenant, Edward Tyson, approached her as she sat in her car and asked to borrow \$20. She agreed, and as Tyson signed a receipt, Dykes approached wearing a stocking mask as a poorly conceived disguise. He put a gun against Bernice's head and demanded her money. Bernice recognized him and told him that he looked like her tenant. Dykes then shot Bernice.

Tyson saw Dykes approach Bernice and point a gun at her. As he fled to safety, he heard the gun 'dry fire' once and then heard two shots in quick succession. Tyson heard Dykes continue to demand money after the "dry fire." After a short interval, the tenant heard the additional shots.

Dykes left the area on foot, over the back fence.

Bernice had been shot in the neck and, in a state of shock, did not notice that Lance was shot and slumped over in the car. Neighbors came to assist the two and called 911. Lance died before reaching the hospital. He was nine years and five days old.

Meanwhile, Dykes changed his clothes and returned to the crime scene. He spoke with a police officer and, pretending to be a helpful scene witness rather than the perpetrator, gave a phony description of the culprit.

Lance was killed by a single gunshot that went through the left side of his chest, penetrating his heart, stomach and liver, and exited on the lower right side of his body. The same bullet that killed Lance first passed through Bernice's neck. Two other bullets were recovered from the car.

Bernice remained hospitalized for several days and initially was not told that Lance had passed away because of fears that she would have a heart attack from the trauma. She never fully recovered from the physical and emotional wounds.

Within days of the murder, Oakland Police Department (OPD) detectives received information indicating that Mr. Dykes was responsible for the shooting. On August 7, 1993, he contacted OPD to determine whether there was a warrant out for his arrest. He

was arrested that same day and admitted that he was responsible for the robbery and murder, though he denied that he intentionally shot and killed either victim, maintaining that the bullet that injured Bernice Clark and killed Lance Clark had been fired unintentionally. He testified similarly at trial.

The trial jurors rejected this testimony and, on August 2, 1993, convicted Mr. Dykes of one count of first degree murder as to Lance Clark, (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder (§§ 664, 189), and one count of robbery (§ 211), both involving Bernice Clark. In connection with each count, the jury found true an allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5.) With respect to the charge of attempted murder, the jury found not true an allegation that the attempted murder had been willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (§§ 189, 664, subd. (a).) In connection with the attempted murder and robbery counts, the jury found true the allegations that the victim suffered great bodily injury and that she was a victim age 70 years or older. (§ 12022.7, subd. (c).) The jury found true a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) Following a penalty phase, the jurors sentenced Mr. Dykes to death on August 24, 1995. The abstract of judgment will be filed with this Motion as Exhibit 1.

Mr. Dykes' conviction and sentence were upheld by the California Supreme Court on June 15, 2009. (*People v. Dykes*, 46 Cal.4th 731.) A state habeas petition was filed on his behalf on July 6, 2004. As will be discussed further below, that petition included an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike to eliminate the only Black juror who was preliminarily seated in the jury box. That petition was denied on August 31, 2011. Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Dykes in federal habeas proceedings on December 21, 2011, and a federal habeas petition was filed on December 21, 2012. The case was referred to United Stated District Judge Vince Chhabria on April 20, 2023 for settlement proceedings. The federal cause of action will be vacated, if this Court grants the People's request for resentencing as recommended herein.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND RECALL, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION GRANTED UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 1172.1

On June 27, 2018, Governor Brown signed into law the Public Safety Omnibus Act of 2018, Assembly Bill ("AB") 1812, which amended the recall and resentencing procedures set forth in the former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) to provide guidance on how the Court should evaluate certain post-conviction factors. Pursuant to AB 1812, courts were directed to consider "postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the inmate's disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the inmate's risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the inmate's original sentencing so that the inmate's continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice." (§ 1172.1)

AB 2942 added district attorneys to the list of parties vested with authority to recommend recall and resentencing to the court. (formerly § 1170, subd. (d)(1); see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 2942 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 17, 2018, p. 3.) The extension of this authority reflected an underlying legislative intent to rely upon the knowledge and insight prosecutors have of postconviction factors that might justify recall and resentencing of an inmate.

On October 8, 2021, Governor Newsom approved Assembly Bill 1540. This new bill amended the former Penal Code §1170(d)(1) and created a presumption favoring recall and resentencing in resentencing hearings "which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk to public safety." (*People v. McMurray* (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035,1040 [explaining the "court is also now required to ... state on the record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel for the defendant"].) The bill authorized the court to grant a resentencing without a hearing whenever the parties are in agreement. It also clarified that the court has the authority to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment and modify the judgment. AB-

1540 was enacted and codified into law as PC §1170.03 on January 1, 2022. On July 1, 2022, this law was renumbered as Penal Code §1172.1.

Penal Code section 1172.1 was amended still again via A.B. 88, which went into effect on January 1, 2024. This amendment added the following provision to the list of pre- and post-conviction factors that the court may consider: "Evidence that the defendant's incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that undermines the integrity of the underlying conviction or sentence." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)

A court can resentence cases involving both indeterminate sentences and determinate sentences. In July 2022, the Legislature clarified that the resentencing scheme also applies to defendants previously sentenced to death. (See Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 200, Sec. 7 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., July 1, 2022).) The court may modify the judgement and change the conviction to a lesser included. The entire sentence may be reconsidered, (*In re Guiomar* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 265, 274; *People v. Garner* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118), and the court can use all of its judicial powers available at the time of the resentencing hearing, including such familiar considerations as: (1) which term of imprisonment should be imposed; (2) whether any enhancements charged should be stricken under Penal Code section 1385; and (3) for multiple charges, whether a sentence should run consecutively or concurrently.

When a court recalls a sentence, it resentences the defendant "as if he or she had not previously been sentenced." (§ 1172.1) As compared with its original sentencing power, the court's resentencing power is restricted in only a few ways. "First, the resentence may not exceed the original sentence. Second, the court must award credit for time served on the original sentence." (*Dix v. Superior Court*, supra, 53 Cal.3d 442, 456; see also *People v. Torres* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1428-29.) The court must rely on the ordinary sentencing rules promulgated by the Judicial Council when resentencing a defendant so as to avoid disparity of sentences. (§ 1172.1.)

Accordingly, the District Attorney requests that this Court recall Ernest Dykes for re-sentencing so that all factors can be given appropriate weight in crafting a just sentence.

RESENTENCING DEFENDANT IS RECOMMENDED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

The resentencing in this case is based on pre- and post-conviction factors pertaining to the defendant and concerns about the constitutionality of his trial.

Pre -Conviction Factors

Section 1172.1 requires a resentencing court to consider whether the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, was a youth, as defined, at the time of the commission of the offense, or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking. (PC § 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)

Youth

Mr. Dykes was twenty years old at the time of the crimes. Youthful impulsivity likely played a role in the offenses, explaining the poor (and dishonorable) decision to rob someone who he knew while ineptly disguised, and the catastrophic, but likely unplanned, decision to pull the trigger when Bernice Clark recognized him as one of her tenants.

Since the time of trial, our understanding of brain development has progressed. Both courts and the legislature now acknowledge that "neurological development, particularly in areas of the brain relevant to judgment and decision making, continues beyond adolescence and into the mid-20's." (*People v. Hardin* (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 846.) Youth are particularly poor at accurately assessing the long-range consequences of their decisions. (See *Miller v. Alabama* (2012) 567 U.S. 477 ("hallmark features" of youth include "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.".)

Psychologist Jeremy Coles evaluated Mr. Dykes on June 12, 2024. A report by psychologist Jeremy Coles is being filed as an exhibit to this motion. (Exhibit 2.) Dr.

Coles specializes in conducting risk assessments, most commonly at the behest of the State of California and related to parole or sexually violent predator proceedings. In Pages 12 and 13 of his report (incorporated herein by reference), he lays out the factors associated with youth recognized and used by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in determining fitness for release. In his report, he also applies them to Mr. Dykes, noting that Mr. Dykes' criminal conduct occurred in the context of an underdeveloped brain and reflected his emotional and neuropsychological immaturity.

Childhood Trauma

Mr. Dykes' childhood was complicated by poverty, neglect and abuse. Throughout his childhood, Mr. Dykes bounced back and forth between his mother and father, both of whose homes were marked by poverty, neglect, and substance abuse. In both homes, he suffered pervasive parental neglect and physical and emotional abuse from his parents and step-parents.

Mr. Dykes' mother was a single-mother raising five children. Among her children, Ernest was the second youngest child, and from a young age often would be left at home alone with his younger sister while his mother was working or otherwise unavailable.

Mr. Dykes had a volatile relationship with his father and his stepmother, Lillian, who his father married when Ernest was ten years old. Lillian did not like Ernest or his siblings. Mr. Dykes' father had a history of violence, beating Ernest "when he needed it," or to appease his stepmother. For example, Mr. Dykes has reported that his stepmother once accused him of tearing one of her dishwashing gloves, causing his father to beat him for this transgression. His mother, stepfather and grandmother would also regularly beat him.

In addition to pervasive poverty, violence, and neglect, Mr. Dykes was raised surrounded by alcohol and substance abuse that led to his own substance abuse issues starting in junior high. Mr. Dykes' father was an alcoholic who would often start drinking in the morning and drink until he passed out.

Dr. Coles discusses these factors in his report at pages 13-15. (Exhibit 2.)

Prior Criminal Record

At age 14, Mr. Dykes was arrested for six counts of burglary and arson. Records indicate that he started three fires at his junior high school between March 28, 1987 and April 3, 1987. He also burglarized the school during that period. Ultimately, he was charged with four counts of burglary, one count of arson, two counts of attempted arson, three counts of trespass, and two counts of vandalism. After sustaining juvenile petitions for these crimes, he was committed to the Chabot group home on May 5, 1987. In a report to the court regarding his aftercare, dated January 28, 1988, it was noted that Mr. Dykes' behavior was satisfactory and he was released to the custody of his father and stepmother.

In 1991, Mr. Dykes was arrested in possession of a handgun. He was sentenced to 5 days in jail and two years of unsupervised probation.

Post-Conviction Factors

Defendant's Disciplinary Record

The Court may consider a defendant's prison disciplinary record in evaluating whether he should be resentenced. (§ 1172.1)

Mr. Dykes' disciplinary record since arriving in CDCR custody has been minimal. In 1997, Mr. Dykes was adjudicated guilty for two offenses. On January 3, 1997, he was found in possession of a contraband razor. Six months later, he was involved in a fistfight on the yard. No serious injuries were reported.

His only other offenses have been obstructing an officer by delaying yard recall (1999), testing positive for THC (2014) and disobeying an order to remove his shirt (2020), an offense for which his only punishment was counseling.

From November 2020 until his move this spring to a Level II prison, Mr. Dykes was housed in San Quentin's North Segregation Unit ("North Seg"), essentially a deathrow honor yard which gave incarcerated people considerably more freedom than in the

erstwhile¹ primary area of death row (East Block). He currently carries a classification score of 19.

Defendant's Programming History

Although programming opportunities at San Quentin's death row were limited, Mr. Dykes programmed positively during his time there. Mr. Dykes obtained his high school equivalency in 2019. (Exhibit 3) Since arriving at CHCF he has taken advantage of educational services, Domestic Violence/Substance Use Disorder Courses, Victim Impact and Restorative Justice classes. CDCR data indicates that he is currently enrolled in "nursing-led therapeutic groups."

Risk and Re-Entry Assessments

As part of efforts to reach a negotiated resolution in this case, the District Attorney's Office required that Mr. Dykes meet with both our Reentry Release Team and, as referenced above, a psychologist specializing in the type of risk assessment conducted by CDCR.

Mr. Dykes is now 52 years old. He has been in custody for over thirty years. Had he received an indeterminate sentence, which he would have if he were charged today, he would have come up for a parole hearing over five years ago, and based on the above factors, would likely have been released.

He has met with the ACDAO's Reentry Release Team, who felt immediate release would be detrimental to Mr. Dykes' successful transition back into the community. They further opined that a continuation of his incarceration for the period contemplated by this recommendation was warranted in order to give Mr. Dykes an opportunity to solidify his plan for release, and so that parole services could be put in place. They did not otherwise express concern about his re-offending upon release.

¹ In May 2024, death row at San Quentin ceased to exist.

As stated by Dr. Coles: "A person who committed an act of violence as a youth is not necessarily prone to do so in the future and might, on the other hand, have changed their behaviors and outlook; they might have a significantly different internal emotional and ideational life. That said, many of the individuals that I assess in prison who are significantly older than they were when they committed their last crimes, continue to display anti-social behaviors [.] Mr. Dykes, on the other hand, has significantly changed his behavior and attitudes." (Exhibit 2.)

Dr. Coles concluded: "[I]t is my unequivocal opinion that Mr. Dykes is not the person that he was in 1993. He has developed insight into himself, is no longer prone to acting impulsively and violently, and is committed to living a prosocial life. ... There is precious little reason to believe that he will return to a life of crime. It is my opinion that he has rehabilitated himself and is at extremely low risk for committing a future act of violence." (Id.)

Given Dr. Coles' expertise, the People respect his judgment and thus recommend the below proposed re-sentencing.

Legal Considerations

The resentencing statute specifically recognizes that, "[e]vidence that the defendant's incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice includes... evidence that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that undermines the integrity of the underlying conviction or sentence." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)

Pursuant to the federal settlement proceedings discussed above, the People reviewed their trial files and identified previously undisclosed materials contained therein indicating that Mr. Dykes' state and federal constitutional rights under *Batson/Wheeler*²

² Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1979) 22 Cal 3rd 258.

had been violated by the trial prosecutors. Recent case law clarifies that jury selection materials are entitled to only a qualified work product privilege,³ and the District Attorney's Office determined that it would be unethical to engage in settlement negotiations meant to reach a final resolution in this matter without disclosing the materials indicating that Mr. Dykes' constitutional right⁴ to a jury selected without racial and ethnic discrimination had been violated. Specifically, the notes indicated that the prosecutors selecting the jury in Mr. Dykes' case were seeking to prevent or limit the number of Black and Jewish jurors serving in his trial. (Exhibit 4 (Selected notes))

The People will lay out only a brief analysis of this issue in this motion. No Black or Jewish jurors served in Mr. Dykes' trial. To achieve this result, the trial prosecutors only needed to strike one Black juror and no *Batson/Wheeler* objection was made at trial. However, the prosecution's jury selection notes make clear that race was a consideration in this strike, and that the prosecution was prepared to manipulate the jury to limit the number of Black and Jewish jurors seated. Thus, for example, Seated Juror #9 was flagged as "Wheeler fodder," an indication that the prosecutor(s) likely intended to strike this juror if necessary in order to justify the strike of a suspect-class juror who shared characteristics with this juror – in this case, having a family member who was incarcerated. (See Exhibit 4.) Similarly, a list solely consisting of qualified Black jurors

³ In *Jones*, the California Supreme Court held that the work product privilege does not "categorically bar[] disclosure of jury selection notes in postconviction discovery." (*People v. Superior Ct. (Jones)* (2021) 12 Cal.5th 348, 365-366.) The discoverability of prosecution jury selection notes was amplified in a subsequent District Court of Appeals decision. "[T]he constitutional imperative of rooting out discrimination in the jury selection process cautions against a broad work product privilege where a prima facie case of racial bias under *Batson/Wheeler* has been made." (*Box v. Superior Court* (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 60, 80.)

⁴ Discriminatory jury selection practices also violate the potential jurors' rights to equal protection and due process. (*Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co.* (1991) 500 U.S 660.)

was made, evidently to identify one that the prosecution would "keep" in order to defeat a *Batson* challenge as to the remaining Black jurors. This was an identical tactic as that used years earlier in another Alameda death penalty trial which resulted in a *Batson* reversal. (*Mitcham v. Davis* (2015) 103 F.Supp.3d 1091, 1118-1119.)

The notes in Mr. Dykes' case were particularly troubling because the lead prosecutor in this trial testified at an evidentiary hearing in 2005 that it would be unethical to deliberately exclude Jewish jurors from jury service. (Exhibit 5.) This same prosecutor was also found to have committed Batson error in another capital trial which resulted in a Life-Without-Parole verdict at the penalty phase. (*Love v. Yates* (2008) 586 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1172-1173 (describing the prosecutor's justifications for striking Black jurors as "concocted," "implausible," and "contradicted by the record in nearly every respect.")

This newly-disclosed evidence of prosecutorial misconduct at trial would have engendered further litigation and almost certainly resulted in relief to Mr. Dykes either under *Batson/Wheeler* or under Penal Code section 745, the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) or both.

The trial prosecutors' actions at trial were unethical and unconstitutional. These actions harmed not only Mr. Dykes' right to a fair trial, but also the victims' survivors.

Rather than prolong the litigation in this case and taking into consideration the pre- and post-conviction factors in this case, the parties have reached a negotiated resolution and the People request that this Court recall and replace Mr. Dykes's conviction and sentence as indicated below.

VICTIM'S NEXT OF KIN

The next of kin in this case will appear in Court to convey their viewpoint on resentencing.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The intent of the parties is to reach a determinate sentence which effectuates Mr. Dykes' release ten months from the date of resentencing, with a standard period of parole

following his release. The purpose of this delay in Mr. Dykes's release is to facilitate CDCR's preparation of re-entry services for his release which will protect the interests of both Mr. Dykes' and the public. Mr. Dykes waives custody, conduct, programming or other credits earned either pretrial or during his CDCR incarceration, necessary to effectuate that result. Likewise, the parties submit to this Court's determination of an alternate disposition which would effectuate the resolution agreed upon by the parties.

The below stipulated resentencing agreement will require Mr. Dykes to waive his right to appeal any irregularities in sentencing and to waive the benefit or ordinary sentencing rules in order to achieve a result which he recognizes is in his best interest. Mr. Dykes will acknowledge that he does so knowingly and voluntarily after consultation with counsel. (See *People v. Hester* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 290; see also *People v. Otterstein* (1987) 189 Cal.App. 3d 1548 [holding that while generally a sentence of 243(d) + GBI is prohibited, where the defendant benefits from the plea bargain and accepts the irregularity with knowledge, the issue is waived]; *People v. Couch* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1056-57 [defendant estopped from challenging his plea bargained for sentence, since he agreed to accept it and thereby waived the alleged errors].)

Count	Original Sentence	Recommended Resentence
Count One: First Degree	Death + 4 years	Voluntary Manslaughter
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circumstances; personal use		21 years
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Count 2: Attempted murder	9+4+3 years= 16 years	9+4+3 years= 16 years
(§§ 664, 189); personal use	(stayed)	consecutive to Count 1, and
of firearm (12022.5); great		without the benefit of Penal
bodily injury and victim 70		Code section 1170.1 (One-
years or older (12022.7(c))		third of the middle term)
Count Three: Robbery (§	3+4+3 years = 10 years	3+4+3 years = 10 years
211); personal use of	(stayed)	(stayed) or imposed as
firearm (12022.5); great		necessary to achieve the
bodily injury and victim 70		negotiated result described
years or older (12022.7(c))		above.

Mr. Dykes will also stipulate that this resentencing is a final resolution of all legal claims known or reasonably knowable including but not limited to claims arising under Penal Code section 745 (the Racial Justice Act).

DATED: July 12, 2024.

Respectfully submitted, District Attorney

Aimee Solway

By:

Aimee Solway
Deputy District Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent

EXHIBIT ONE: ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT

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EXHIBIT TWO: RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

*** Filed Under Seal ***

EXHIBIT THREE: GED CERTIFICATE

State of California

Migh School Kquibalency Certificate

This is to certify that

ERNEST DYKES

has met the standard of performance established by the California State Board of Education for successful completion of the High School Equivalency Tests and is, therefore, entitled to this High School Equivalency Certificate.



State Superintendent of Public Instruction

President of the
California State Board of Education

Credentialed on: October 10, 2019 Printed on: February 29, 2020

EXHIBIT FOUR: EXCERPTS OF JURY SELECTION NOTES

Hayward Rough Life - prior DU I's
Unemployed but his work history.
Really a good just - Her
own son convictory sage fel. She was surprised how little
time he got
Thinks D/P Necessary

Must Kick - son convicted
must kick as wheeler folder

2 daughters Jewish Physics, Educated in home Russias, Educated in home Russia, st. Beterburg I liked him better than any other flew Bist No Way Fossible I Q of 180 415

FB 25 Single Oak.

UC Berkley Poli. Sci. Deg.

From New Jersey, Successful family
Lives of make roomate

Says she Guld do it but I don't know if


I believe her—

Very Thoughtful— don't know if act or sincon.

No Kids >

Jew? Seltzer offer name
from New York

The proper punishment for
shoughtful outrogense crime
but never Married / 1 child
a strong
Ant; Elderly/children crimes
background Ant; Elderly/children crimes
background Ant; Elderly/children crimes
background Septe be aut; D/P, Now Pro in
some cases



Ayrs. Army - comissioned officer Captain

Degree Bacteriology bean Raye LA

Has some concorns re race/economic status

affecting sypotante system - But honost

and judge case on its merits
Prior Jury 187pc agritted ID case

Seems Like squad away but why Si

live in Bendley? Also Lic. Plate Says

B Free

Triend of OPD Chief, For DIP Killing must

ge intertion

EXHIBIT FIVE: TESTIMONY OF COLTON CARMINE IN *IN RE FREEMAN*

24	inrefreeman3-23-05am#1.prt.txt THE COURT: May this witness be excused?	
25	MR. SOWARDS: Yes.	
26	MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, Your Honor.	
27	THE COURT: All right.	
28	Thank you very much. You are excused.	
		343
1	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	
2	THE COURT: Counsel, you anticipate that the	
3	other witness will be here this afternoon?	
4	MR. SOWARDS: That's what I need to check on,	
5	with the Court's indulgence, because of the medical	
6	appointment.	
7	THE COURT: All right. If there is no	
8	objection, Counsel, you can call your next witness.	
9	MR. SOWARDS: Thank you.	
10	MR. WILLIAMSON: I would like to call	
11	Mr. Colton Carmine, C-a-r-m-i-n-e.	
12	THE COURT: Please step forward.	
13	COLTON CARMINE,	
14	Called as a witness on behalf of the PEOPLE, was sworn	
15	and examined and testified as follows:	
16	THE COURT: Good morning.	
17	THE WITNESS: Good morning.	
18	THE COURT: Please have a seat to my right.	
19	DIRECT EXAMINATION	
20	BY MR. WILLIAMSON:	
21	Q. Sir, could you please state your full name and	
22	spell your name for the record, please?	
23	A. Colton Carmine, C-a-r-m-i-n-e.	
24	Q. Would you tell us how you are employed and	
	Page 56	

- 25 what you do for a living, please.
- 26 A. I'm an Alameda County deputy district attorney
- 27 since 1979.
- Q. What I would like to do, Mr. Carmine, is ask

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- 1 you if you know a former deputy who worked in the
- 2 Alameda County D.A.'s Office by the name of Jack
- 3 Quatman?
- 4 A. I knew him. I haven't seen him for a number
- 5 of years.
- 6 Q. Could you tell me for how long a period of
- 7 time did you know Mr. Quatman while he was at the
- 8 Alameda County D.A.'s office approximately?
- 9 A. An awfully long time. I worked in the file
- 10 room since I was 22, so I actually worked there since
- 11 '76. And so basically my whole adult life until he
- 12 left.
- 13 Q. Did you have personal and professional
- 14 dealings -- strike that.
- 15 Did you have professional dealings with Mr. Quatman
- 16 while he was in the office and you were a deputy
- 17 district attorney?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Did he ever supervise you in any fashion?
- 20 A. He didn't supervise me that -- he was never my
- 21 team leader, but he was someone that -- there was a time
- 22 when I respected him and I thought he had an excellent
- 23 track record. I would go to him for advice from time to
- 24 time.
- Q. Has your respect for him changed now?

Page 57

28 with Mr. Quatman having worked with him and so forth, as to whether or not he's an honest and credible person? 1 2 I can't speak for others, but as to myself, Α. 3 there are --MR. SOWARDS: Object to that. It's not based 4 5 on reputation, irrelevant. MR. WILLIAMSON: I think we're offering an 6 7 opinion, we're not getting a reputation yet. THE COURT: You haven't laid a sufficient 8 foundation yet for an opinion, so I will sustain the 9 10 objection --MR. WILLIAMSON: How long --11 12 THE COURT: Excuse me --13 MR. WILLIAMSON: Excuse me. 14 THE COURT: Let me say, I sustain the 15 objection. 16 MR. SOWARDS: Thank you. (by Mr. Williams) How long did you work with 17 0. 18 Mr. Quatman? In various capacities for probably, with some 19 Α. 20 interruption of a year or so where he would be 21 transferred away or I would. I would say a period of 22, 20 years. 22 23 Were there other situations arising involving Q. 24 Mr. Quatman where you came to yourself question whether 25 or not he was a credible person? On several occasions. There was one paramount 26 Α. Page 58

inrefreeman3-23-05am#1.prt.txt

Do you have an opinion from your relationship

26

27

Α.

Q.

Yes.

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28
         Q.
               Tell us what that situation was.
                                                                     346
 1
               MR. SOWARDS: Objection to specific instances,
 2
     irrelevant.
 3
               THE COURT: Your response?
 4
               MR. WILLIAMSON: He wanted a foundation as to
 5
     why he has the opinion that he has. I'm laying a
 6
     foundation.
               THE COURT: So you are offering, you intend to
 7
 8
     offer this witness as an opinion, is that correct?
 9
               MR. WILLIAMSON: That's correct.
               THE COURT: All right. And you're attempting
10
11
     to lay a foundation as to why he is in the position to
12
     offer such an opinion?
13
               MR. WILLIAMSON: That is exactly correct.
               THE COURT: Therefore what this witness is
14
15
     about to reveal is not for the truth of the incident,
16
     but simply to establish his expertise.
17
               MR. WILLIAMSON: To establish that he has a
18
     bonafide basis for an opinion.
19
               THE COURT: Expertise in the sense that he can
20
     offer an opinion?
21
               MR. WILLIAMSON: That is right.
22
               THE COURT: Further comment?
23
               MR. SOWARDS: If it's not being offered for
24
     the truth of the matter, then I don't think it forms an
25
     appropriate basis. I think it's also -- instances to
26
     establish reputation for character traits.
27
               MR. WILLIAMSON: That's not what I'm
                             Page 59
```

27

in my mind.

1	THE COURT: You chailenged this witnesses
2	ability to offer an opinion.
3	MR. SOWARDS: Yes, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Counsel is trying to show why this
5	witness is in a position to offer such an opinion. If
6	you withdraw that objection, then we won't get to the
7	point of hearing about this incident. If you don't,
8	it's going to be limited to whether this witness has
9	been in a position to offer such an opinion.
10	MR. SOWARDS: Then I will withdraw it and ask
11	it be limited to his exposure.
12	THE COURT: So you are not going to challenge
13	this witnesses' ability to offer an opinion?
14	MR. SOWARDS: Well, I am objecting to an
15	opinion that has no basis. And I understand, Counsel,
16	that you don't understand
17	THE COURT: That's not necessary.
18	MR. SOWARDS: I understand the proffer to the
19	Court was that this was not necessarily being offered
20	for the truth of the matter. So I'm saying that I
21	think, then we have an unreliable basis for the opinion
22	and no foundation.
23	THE COURT: Then I'm going to accept the
24	testimony for the limited basis of whether this witness
25	is qualified to offer an opinion and for no other
26	reason.
27	Go ahead, please.
28	MR. WILLIAMSON: Is the Court going to allow
	Page 60

- 1 Counsel to elicit the basis for the opinion, even though
- 2 it's not offered for the truth of the --
- 3 THE COURT: That's what I'm indicating.
- 4 I may not be making myself clear.
- 5 Obviously there is an objection.
- 6 Counsel is contending this witness is not qualified
- 7 to give an opinion.
- 8 You're attempting to respond to that objection by
- 9 showing that he is. And as part of your demonstration,
- 10 apparently this witness is going to refer to a specific
- 11 incident.
- 12 What I'm indicating is I will hear the incident
- 13 with reference to the issue of whether he's qualified to
- 14 offer an opinion.
- MR. WILLIAMSON: That's fine. I understood
- 16 the Court's ruling.
- 17 Q. (by Mr. Williamson) Sir, can you tell us where
- 18 you have an opinion as to Mr. Quatman's honesty or
- 19 veracity?
- 20 A. There is more than one incident. Would you
- 21 like --
- Q. Why don't we start with the first one.
- 23 A. When I was new to trying felony cases, I had
- 24 gone to the municipal courts, and I worked at the
- 25 superior court in the file room, so I already knew a
- 26 lot of people. In fact, I know many people in the
- 27 audience.
- When I finally came back and made it to team 22

- 1 where I was on the murder team, it was not the capital
- 2 prosecution team. It was strictly the team that tried
- 3 murder cases. And I was experiencing exasperation. We
- 4 had been looking for a witness and couldn't find them.
- 5 Then my inspector would dig them up in the 11th hour. I
- 6 would get them in the office and they would say, "I
- 7 don't remember." "I don't recall," even though I would
- 8 have a statement of testimony given in front of them of
- 9 the Grand Jury or preliminary hearing.
- 10 Q. So this was a recanting witness problem or
- 11 witness reluctant --
- 12 MR. SOWARDS: Object to that as leading.
- 13 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 14 Q. (by Mr. Williams) Go ahead.
- 15 MR. SOWARDS: There is no question --
- 16 (Whereupon, the Reporter requests the
- 17 Attorneys to speak one at a time to secure an accurate
- 18 record.)
- 19 Q. (by Mr. Williams) How did this situation come
- 20 to involve Mr. Quatman and the feelings that you have
- 21 about him?
- 22 A. Well, first to explain that, let me say, when
- 23 you come from court at the end of the day, at 4:30,
- 24 5:00, whenever the court chooses to adjourn, we're on
- 25 the ninth floor, same building, walk up a couple flights
- 26 of stairs, and there is usually a lot of people standing
- 27 around, if they're not in trial themselves. And they'll
- 28 ask you what went on. And I, as I said, was exasperated

- 1 and Jack Quatman was standing in the hallway with some
- 2 other people asked me what is wrong. I was explaining
- 3 it and it's a common occurrence. He asked me to come
- 4 into his office and he said "Colton, here is what you
- 5 do." And he sat me down in a chair.
- 6 Each of our offices would have one or two desks and
- 7 several chairs where people would sit when you
- 8 interviewed them. And he sat down and said, "This is
- 9 what you do." And I took that to mean as if I was the
- 10 reluctant witness. And he walked over to his desk-
- 11 drawer and pulled out a plastic bag that looked like a
- 12 bindle of some sort of drugs, came over and threw it
- 13 down at my feet, and said, "Colton, just do that, and
- 14 you tell them, 'It's that easy. If you don't want to
- 15 come across, it's that easy'."
- 16 Q. Were there other incidents beside this
- 17 incident?
- 18 A. He gave me a case once. He wanted to try the
- 19 capital cases that would have the best prospect of
- 20 coming back with a death verdict.
- 21 It's no secret that people in this business are
- 22 sometimes egotistical, and he was that to a high degree.
- 23 There was a case that --
- 24 MR. SOWARDS: Ask that that be stricken, Your
- 25 Honor, as irrelevant and nonresponsive.
- 26 THE COURT: I will strike the part of the
- 27 response where the witness commented on ego.
- Q. (by Mr. Williamson) The second incident

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Concerning the capital case --Page 63

- THE WITNESS: He had a case. It was a
- 3 potentially capital case. One murder had been held to
- 4 answer and was in fact pending trial. Another unjointed
- 5 count of murder that was charged in a different
- 6 jurisdiction within Alameda County in a different
- 7 municipal court and was still awaiting preliminary
- 8 hearing.
- 9 We tried to get them together to go to trial on
- 10 multiple murder scenarios, but they were able to delay
- 11 one of the cases and then push the other case along. So
- 12 I was gonna go to trial on the case. And if I won that,
- 13 then we would have the other case held to answer and
- 14 bring it up and try it as a prior murder.
- 15 O. So how does it involve Mr. Quatman?
- 16 A. He had the case, and he came to me and said --
- 17 I had never handled a case like this.
- 18 He came to me and said, "This is assigned to me,
- 19 but you are new and I want you to have a good case to
- 20 start with." And he laid it out to me in no short order
- 21 -- the case was gonna start within a few days. And so I
- 22 didn't know a lot about the case. I agreed to take it.
- 23 Q. Based upon his representation?
- 24 A. Yes. Although to be honest, I was not in a
- 25 position to decline it --
- 26 Q. Were the rep --
- 27 A. -- he was superior to me, and he could have
- 28 directed my team leader for me to do it. I wouldn't

- 1 push that.
- Q. Were his representations made to you in Page 64

- 3 describing the case accurate and true?
- 4 A. No, they weren't.
- 5 MR. SOWARDS: Object to that as vague.
- 6 Representations in what regard?
- 7 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 8 Q. (by Mr. Williams) Did he make the
- 9 representation to you about the facts of the case?
- 10 A. He made the case sound a lot better than it
- 11 was proof-wise, especially with regard to the case that
- 12 wasn't at the courthouse yet. That was still pending in
- 13 Berkeley Municipal Court pending preliminary hearing.
- 14 Q. Did you actually receive the case file, the
- 15 case that he had given to you for you to do?
- 16 A. The one that was already at the courthouse
- 17 that was gonna start in two, three days? Yes, he gave
- 18 me that case. The other case was still down in
- 19 municipal court so he didn't have it, but he basically
- 20 briefed me on the facts of that.
- I went to trial on the case that he gave me. It
- 22 came back the way it should have -- I wouldn't say that.
- 23 That's a poor choice of words. -- came back with what
- 24 -- he was charged with first degree murder with the use
- 25 of a firearm.
- Q. Did he make any misrepresentations to you
- 27 regarding the facts of the first case?
- 28 A. Yes, he did. The reliability or ease with

- which I would be able to use the defendant's girlfriend
- 2 who was supposedly cooperative.
- 3 Q. What about the second case? Page 65

- 4 A. That case ultimately had to be dismissed
- 5 because it was not provable.
- 6 Q. Had he made representations to you regarding
- 7 the goodness of the second case when you talked to
- 8 him?
- 9 A. He got me to take the case based on the
- 10 reputation that this would get to be my first capital
- 11 prosecution.
- 12 Q. Did you have the opinion that he had made
- 13 material misrepresentations to you when he described
- 14 these cases to you --
- 15 MR. SOWARDS: Objection, leading.
- 16 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 17 Q. (by Mr. Williamson) Now were there any other
- 18 incidents that stick out in your mind right now bearing
- 19 the issue of Mr. Quatman and his voracity?
- 20 A. He was somebody that exaggerated a lot, and he
- 21 was quick to criticize others. He could dish it out but
- 22 he couldn't take it.
- Q. Let me ask you the bottom line --
- 24 MR. SOWARDS: Object to the last part. It's
- 25 irrelevant.
- 26 THE COURT: I will strike the comment. "dish
- 27 it out but couldn't take it."
- 28 Q. (by Mr. Williams) Let's get down to the

- 1 bottom line.
- 2 Do you have an opinion as you sit there now given
- 3 your relationship with Mr. Quatman over the years as to
- 4 his honesty or veracity?

- 5 A. I do.
- 6 Q. Could you tell the Court what your opinion is
- 7 in that regard?
- 8 A. He would tell the truth if it suits him. I
- 9 don't think he's above misrepresenting someone if he
- 10 thought that would give him --
- 11 Q. Do you think he's ethical?
- 12 A. No, I don't. And I have -- there is one other
- 13 incident that I would like to talk about.
- 14 THE COURT: That's nonresponsive.
- 15 Just answer the --
- 16 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think he's ethical.
- 17 Q. (by Mr. Williamson) Can you tell me why you
- 18 don't think he's ethical?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Could you.
- 21 A. It was either 1990 or '91 and it's a factor
- 22 that can be ascertained with ease.
- 23 It was a C-D-A-A, that's the California District
- 24 Attorney Association Capital Prosecution Seminar, and it
- 25 was being held in San Diego. And by that time I was
- 26 trying capital cases. And I went to the seminar. And
- 27 Jack Quatman was amongst a great number of other people
- 28 were presenters or speakers at a formalized presentation

- 1 under his aspects of handling these types of cases.
- 2 His address to the group -- and it was a large
- 3 group. It had to be 200, 300 people -- bigger than a
- 4 giant ballroom in a hotel in San Diego -- on jury
- 5 selection he said, "You should to never ever" -- and I Page 67

- 6 should say. He prefaced these remarks because there was
- 7 some people, that I didn't know, but I guess he did
- 8 know, that were of the Jewish faith that were attending,
- 9 and in fact, some of the panelists. And that he
- 10 prefaced his remarks by saying, "I know I probably
- 11 shouldn't say this, and I'm probably gonna get in
- 12 trouble." And he looked off to the side and said, "but
- 13 it has to be said."
- 14 He said, "Never, ever leave a Jewish person on a
- 15 capital jury. It's just not fair to the case, and it's
- 16 not fair to the jurors, given what's happened to them in
- 17 the past to ask them to execute another human being by
- 18 lethal gas."
- 19 Q. Given the status of California federal law at
- 20 the time, do you think that that was an ethical
- 21 statement to make?
- 22 A. I don't think it's an ethical statement to
- 23 make whether I'm a lawyer or not.
- 24 Q. Now did you ever discuss Mr. Quatman's honesty
- 25 and voracity and ethics with any other lawyers in or
- 26 outside the office?
- 27 A. A little bit. I talked -- when -- I've never
- 28 read the declaration that is, that I've heard reference

- 1 to a declaration. I have not seen it.
- I haven't talked to Jack Quatman.
- 3 Q. How about other people? Have you talked to
- 4 other people --
- 5 MR. SOWARDS: I'm sorry.
- 6 The last part was nonresponsive, Your Honor. I
 Page 68

- 7 would object to that.
- 8 THE COURT: The last comment will be ordered
- 9 stricken.
- 10 Q. (by Mr. Williamson) Have you discussed
- 11 Mr. Quatman's honesty and veracity and ethics with any
- 12 other people?
- 13 A. I've discussed it --
- 14 MR. SOWARDS: Object to that as vague as to
- 15 time, Your Honor.
- 16 MR. WILLIAMSON: At any point in time that you
- 17 knew Mr. Quatman.
- 18 THE WITNESS: Yes. And it's -- if you are
- 19 talking about the period of time when he was still in
- 20 the office, there was a period of time before he left
- 21 that he was sort of -- maybe exiled is not the right
- 22 word. But he was disciplined for remarks he'd made
- 23 about a woman lawyer in our office --
- Q. Let me get to a more specific --
- 25 A. -- it was before that. Because once that
- 26 happened, he was no longer in the, or no longer amongst
- 27 us.
- 28 Q. So your answer is yes.

- 1 Did you discuss Mr. Carmine's (sic) credibility
- 2 with --
- 3 A. Mr. Quatman's.
- 4 Q. I'm -- excuse me. Mr. Quatman's credibility
- 5 and honesty with other people?
- A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Based upon your discussions of Mr. Quatman's Page 69

8	honesty and credibility with other people, did you come	
9	to believe that he had a reputation for not being an	
10	honest and forthright person?	
11	A. If it didn't serve his purpose, he wouldn't	
12	tell the truth.	
13	MR. WILLIAMSON: I have no further questions	
14	at this time.	
15	THE COURT: We're going to take the morning	
16	recess for ten minutes.	
17	(Whereupon, the morning recess was taken.)	
18	000	
19		
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27		
28		
		359
1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)	
2	OUNTY OF SANTA CLARA)	
3	TANK USULAND de hareby courtify there	
4	I, TANYA HOLLAND, do hereby certify that: I am an Official Certified Shorthand Reporter of	
5	the Santa Clara County Superior Court; I was the duly appointed, qualified, and acting Official Shorthand Reporter of said court in the matter	
6	of People of the State of California versus FRED H.	
7	FREEMAN, Case Number S122590, taken on 3-23-05. I reported the same in machine shorthand, and	
8	thereafter had the same transcribed into typewriting as herein appears, and that the foregoing Pages 289 through	
U	Page 70	